Abstract. We formulate a massively general framework for optimal dynamic stochastic control problems which allows for a control-dependent informational structure. The issue of informational consistency is brought to light and investigated. Bellman's principle is formulated and proved. In a series of related results, we expound on the informational structure in the context of (completed) natural filtrations of (stochastic) processes.
(•) In economics the so-called class of bandit models is well-known (see the excellent literature overview in [8] ). These are "sequential decision problems where, at each stage, a resource like time, effort or money has to be allocated strategically between several options, referred to as the arms of the bandit." And further: "The key idea in this class of models is that agents face a tradeoff between experimentation (gathering information on the returns to each arm) and exploitation (choosing the arm with the highest expected value)." [8, p. 2] .
(•) Miscellaneous other situations in which the control is non-trivially, and naturally, adapted, or even previsible, with respect to an informational flow, which it itself influences and helps engender, abound: controlling the movement of a probe in a stochastic field, only the local values of the field being observable, and costs/rewards associated with the speed of movement/intensity of the field (cf. Example 2.11); a similar situation for movement on a random graph, being only able to observe the values attached to the vertices visited; additively controlling a process, but observing the sum of the process itself and of the control etc.
In short, the phenomenon is ubiquitous; we suggest it is the norm, rather than the exception.
In particular, then, one should like a general framework for stochastic control (equipped with a suitable abstract version of Bellman's principle) which makes such a control-dependent informational flow explicit and inherent in its machinery. The (seeming) circularity of the controls being adapted to an informational structure which they themselves help engender, makes this a somewhat delicate point. Indeed, it would seem, this is the one aspect of general (abstract) dynamic stochastic control which has not yet received due attention in existing literature. Hitherto, only a single, non-control dependent, observable [5] informational flow [15, 14] appears to have been allowed. (This is of course not to say that the phenomenon has not entered and been studied in the literature in specific situations/problems, see e.g. [6, 8, 7, 16] [1, Chapter 8] and the references therein; the focus there having been (for the most part) on reducing (i.e. a priori proving a suitable equivalence of) the original control problem, which is based on partial control-dependent observation, to an associated 'separated ' problem, which is based on complete observation.)
In the present paper we attempt to fill this gap in the literature, by putting forward a general stochastic control framework which explicitly allows for a control-dependent informational flow -as it were 'embracing it', rather than trying to circumvent it in some or another manner. (Recognizing that it may not always be advantageous, or indeed possible, to work with an equivalent (but more complex) 'separated' formulation.) In particular, we provide a fully general (modulo a mild technical assumption) abstract version of Bellman's principle in such a setting. This is the content of Part 1.
Specifically, Section 2 formally defines a system of stochastic control (in which observed information is an explicit function of control); Section 3 discusses its conditional payoff and 'Bellman' system; Section 4 formulates Bellman's principle -Theorem 4.6 is our main result. Lastly, Section 5 contains the solution to a formal (but artificial) example, illustrating some of the main ideas of this paper; several other (counter)examples are also given along the way. Now, a crucial requirement for the above programme to be successful is that of informational consistency over controls (cf. Assumption 2.9): if two controls agree up to a certain time, then what we have observed up to that time should also agree. Especially at the level of random (stopping) times, this becomes a non-trivial statement -for example, when the observed information is that generated by a (controlled) process, which is often the case. We expound on this issue of informational consistency in the context of (completed) natural filtrations of processes in Part 2.
Specifically, we consider there, amongst others relevant, the following natural and pertinent question, which is interesting in its own right: if X and Y are two processes, and S a stopping time of one or both of their (possibly completed) natural filtrations, with the stopped processes agreeing, X S = Y S (possibly only with probability one), must the two (completed) natural filtrations at the time S agree also? To answer this question (with proofs) is non-trivial in the temporally nondiscrete case, and several related findings are obtained along the way (see the introductory remarks to Part 2, on p. 20, for a more detailed account). In essence they are (consequences of/connected with) a generalization (Theorem 6.6) of (a part of) Galmarino's test, available in literature for coordinate processes on canonical spaces [4, p. 149, Theorem IV.100] [11, p. 320, Lemma 4 .18], and extended here to a not necessarily canonical setting.
Conventions. Throughout this paper, for a probability measure P on Ω and A ⊂ Ω, some property in ω ∈ A will be said to hold P-a.s. on A, if the set of ω ∈ A for which the property does not hold is first measurable (i.e. belongs to the domain of P), and second is of P-measure zero.
When A = Ω, we shall of course just say that the property holds P-a.s. Finally, for L ⊂ 2 Ω and A ⊂ Ω, L| A := {L ∩ A : L ∈ L} is the trace of L on A.
Part 1. Optimal dynamic stochastic control with control-dependent information
As announced in the Introduction, we provide and analyze in this part, a framework for optimal dynamic stochastic control, in which information is explicitly control-dependent. The informational flow itself is modeled using filtrations, and this can be done in one of the following two, essentially different, ways:
(1) Dealing with events 'with certainty', irrespective of the presence of probability.
(2) Dealing with events 'up to a.s. equality', insisting that the filtrations be complete relative to the underlying probability measure(s).
We develop the second 'probabilistic' approach -of complete filtrations -in parallel to the default first -for lack of a better word, 'measure-theoretic' -setting. Indeed, the formal differences between the two approaches are minor. For the most part one has merely to add, in the 'complete' setting, a number of a.s. qualifiers. We will put these, and any other eventual differences of the second approach as compared to the first, in {} braces. This will enforce a strict separation between the two settings, while still allowing us to repeat ourselves as little as possible.
Stochastic control systems
We begin by specifying the formal ingredients of a system of optimal dynamic stochastic control.
Setting 2.1 (Stochastic control system). A stochastic control system consists of:
(i) A set T with a linear (antisymmetric, transitive & total) ordering ≤. We will assume (for simplicity) either T = N 0 , or else T = [0, ∞), with the usual order. T is the time set.
(ii) A set C. The set of admissible controls. (These might be {equivalence classes of} processes or stopping times, or something different altogether.) (iii) A set Ω endowed with a collection of σ-algebras (F c ) c∈C . Ω is the sample space and F c is all the information accumulated (but not necessarily acquired by the controller) by the "end of time" or, possibly, by a "terminal time", when c is the chosen control. For example, in the case of optimal stopping, when there is given a process X, and it is stopped, the set of controls C would be the {equivalence classes of the} stopping times of the {completed} natural filtration of X, and for any S ∈ C, F S = σ(X S ), the σ-field generated by the stopped process {or its completion}. We understand here optimal stopping in the strict sense: the exogenous act is that of stopping, not sampling; after the process has been stopped, it ceases to change.
(iv) (P c ) c∈C , a collection of {complete} probability measures, each P c having domain which includes the {P c -complete} σ-field F c (for c ∈ C). The controller chooses a probability measure from the collection (P c ) c∈C . This allows for incorporation of the Girsanov approach to control, wherein the controller is seen as affecting the probability measure, rather than the random payoff. From the point of view of information, being concerned with laws rather than random elements, it is of course somewhat unnatural. Nevertheless, we will formally allow for it -it costs us nothing.
being F c measurable (as c runs over C) {and defined up to P c -a.s. equality}. We further insist E P c J(c) − < ∞ for all c ∈ C. Given the control c ∈ C, J(c) is the random payoff. Hence, in general, we allow both the payoff, as well as the probability law, to vary.
, and (for simplicity) that G c 0 is P c -trivial (for all c ∈ C) {and contains all the P c -null sets}, while
e. the null sets for P c and P d are the same} and
G c t is the information acquired by the controller by time t ∈ T , if the control chosen is c ∈ C (e.g. G c may be the {completed} natural filtration of an observable process X c which depends on c). Perfect recollection is thus assumed. Definition 2.2 (Optimal expected payoff). We define v := sup c∈C E P c J(c) (sup ∅ := −∞), the optimal expected payoff. Next, c ∈ C is said to be optimal if E P c J(c) = v. Finally, a C-valued net is said to be optimizing if its limit is v. Remark 2.3.
(1) It is, in some sense, no restriction, to have assumed the integrability of the negative parts of J in Setting 2.1(v). For, allowing any extra controls c for which E P c J(c) − = ∞, but for which E P c J(c) would still be defined, would not change the value of v (albeit it could change whether or not C is empty, but this is a trivial consideration).
(2) It is not natural a priori to insist on each J(c) being G c ∞ -measurable (for c ∈ C). The outcome of our controlled experiment need not be known to us (the controller) at all -not even by the end of time; all we are concerned with is the maximization of its expectation.
(3) In the case C is a collection of processes, the natural requirement is for each such process c ∈ C to be adapted (perhaps even previsible with respect) to G c . If it is a collection of 1 All filtrations will be assumed to have the parameter set T . random times, then each such c ∈ C should presumably be a (possibly predictable) stopping time of G c . But we do not formally insist on this.
We now introduce the concept of a controlled time, a (we would argue, natural) generalization of the notion of a stopping time to the setting of control-dependent filtrations.
Definition 2.4 (Controlled times)
. A collection of random times S = (S c ) c∈C is called a controlled time, if S c is a {defined up to P c -a.s. equality} stopping time of G c for every c ∈ C. Example 2.5. A typical situation to have in mind is the following. What is observed is a process X c , its values being contingent on the chosen control c (this may, but need not, be the controlled process, e.g. it might be some non one-to-one function of it). Then G c is the {completed} natural filtration of X c . Letting, for example, for each c ∈ C, S c be the first entrance time of X c into some fixed set, the collection (S c ) c∈C would constitute a controlled time (as long as one can formally establish the stopping time property). Definition 2.6 (Deterministic and control-constant times). If there is some a ∈ T ∪ {∞}, such that S c (ω) = a for {P c -almost} all ω ∈ Ω, and every c ∈ C, then S is called a deterministic time.
More generally, if there is a random time S, which is a stopping time of G c and S c = S {P c -a.s} for each c ∈ C, then S is called a control-constant time.
As yet, C is an entirely abstract set with no dynamic structure attached to it. The following establishes this structure. The reader should think of D(c, S) as being the controls "agreeing {a.s.} with c up to time S". (Example 2.11 and Section 5 contain definitions of the collections D(c, S) in the (specific) situations described there.) Setting 2.7 (Stochastic control system (cont'd) -control dynamics). There is given a collection G of controlled times. Further, adjoined to the stochastic control system of Setting 2.1, is a family (D(c, S)) (c,S)∈C×G of subsets of C for which:
(5) For each S ∈ G, {D(c, S) : c ∈ C} is a partition of C.
(6) For all (c, S) ∈ C × G: D(c, S) = {c} (resp. D(c, S) = C), if S c is identically {or P c -a.s.} equal to ∞ (resp. 0). Using this dynamical structure, a natural assumption on the temporal consistency of the filtrations (G c ) c∈C and the measures (P c ) c∈C -indeed a key condition on whose validity we shall insist throughout -is as follows: Assumption 2.9 (Temporal consistency). For all {c, d} ⊂ C and S ∈ G satisfying c ∼ S d, we
Several remarks are now in order.
(•) First, when S is a non-control-constant time (e.g. when S c is the first entrance time into some fixed set of an observed controlled process X c , as c runs over C), then already the provisions of Setting 2.7 (leaving aside, for the moment, Assumption 2.9) are far from being entirely innocuous, viz. condition Setting 2.7(2) (which, e.g. would then be saying that controls agreeing with c up to the first entrance time S c of the observed controlled process X c , will actually leave the latter invariant). They are thus as much a restriction/consistency requirement on the family D, as they are on which controlled times we can put into the collection G. Put differently, G is not (necessarily) a completely arbitrary, if non-specified, collection of controlled times. For, a controlled time is just any family of G c -stopping times, as c runs over the control set C. The members of G, however, enjoy the further property of "agreeing between two controls, if the latter coincide prior to them". This is of course trivially satisfied for deterministic times (and, more generally, control-constant stopping times), but may hold of other controlled times as well.
(•) Second, the choice of the family G is guided by the specific problem at hand: not all controlled times are of interest. For example, sometimes the deterministic times may be relevant, the others not. On the other hand, it may be possible to effect the act of "controlling" only at some collection of (possibly non-control-constant) stopping times -then these times may be particularly worthy of study. The following example illustrates this point already in the control-independent informational setting (anticipating somewhat certain concepts, like the Bellman system, and conditional optimality, which we have not yet formally introduced; the reader might return to it once he has studied Sections 3 and 4).
Example 2.10. Given: a probability space (Ω, F, P); on it an N 0 -valued càdlàg Poisson process N of unit intensity with arrival times (S n ) n∈N 0 , S 0 := 0, S n < ∞ for all n ∈ N; an independent independency of random signs (R n ) n∈N 0 with values in {−1, +1}, P(R n = +1) = 1 − P(R n = −1) = 2/3.
The "observed process" is
(so to N is added a drift of R n during the random time interval [S n , S n+1 ), n ≥ 0). Let G be the natural filtration of W . Remark the arrival times of N are stopping times of G.
The set of controls C, on the other hand, consists of real-valued, measurable processes, starting at 0, which are adapted to the natural filtration of the bivariate process (W 1 {∆N =0} , N ) (where ∆N is the jump process of N ; intuitively, we must decide on the strategy for the whole of [S n , S n+1 ) based on the information available at time S n already, n ≥ 0). For X ∈ C consider the penalty
(continuous penalization with discounting rate α ∈ (0, +∞) of any deviation from the process W by the control X). Let v := inf X∈C EJ(X) be the optimal expected penalty; clearly an optimal control is the processX which takes the value of W at the instances which are the arrival times of N and assumes a drift of +1 in between those instances, so that v = 1/(3α). Next, for X ∈ C, let
be the Bellman system. We shall say Y ∈ C is conditionally admissible at time S for the control
(1) We maintain first that the process (V t ) t∈[0,∞) (the Bellman process (i.e. system at the deterministic times) for the optimal control), is not mean nondecreasing (in particular, is not a submartingale, let alone a martingale with respect to G) and admits no a.s. right-continuous version.
For, V 0 = v; while for t ∈ (0, ∞), the following control, denoted X , is, apart fromX, also conditionally admissible at time t forX: It assumes the value of W at the instances of the arrival times of N , and a drift of +1 in between those intervals, until before (inclusive of) time t; strictly after time t and until strictly before the first arrival time of N which is ≥ t, denoted S t , it takes the values of the process which starts at the value of W at the last arrival time of N strictly before t and a drift of −1 thereafter; and after (and inclusive of) the instance S t , it resumes to assume the values of W at the arrival times of N and a drift of +1 in between those times.
Notice also that R t 1(t is not an arrival time of N ) ∈ G t , where R t = n∈N 0 R n 1 [Sn,S n+1 ) (t), i.e. R t 1(t is not an arrival time of N ) is the drift at time t, on the (almost certain) event that t is not an arrival time of N , zero otherwise. It follows that, sinceX is conditionally admissible forX at time t:
so EV t 1 {Rt=+1} ≤ EJ(X)1 {Rt=+1} ; whereas since X is also conditionally admissible at time t for X:
(properties of marked Poisson processes). Summing the two inequalities we obtain
implying the desired conclusion (for the nonexistence of a right continuous version, assume the converse, reach a contradiction via uniform integrability).
(2) We maintain second that the process (V X Sn ) n∈N 0 , however, is a discrete-time submartingale (and martingale with X =X) with respect to (G Sn ) n∈N 0 , for all X ∈ C.
For X =X, this follows at once from the obvious observation thatX is conditionally optimal at each of the arrival instances of N . On the other hand, for arbitrary X ∈ C, n ∈ N 0 , G ∈ G Sn , and {Y, Z} ⊂ C with Y Sn = X Sn = Z Sn , the control which coincides with Y (hence Z) on [0, S n ] and then with Y (resp. Z) on (resp. the complement of) G strictly after S n , is conditionally admissible at time S n for X. The desired conclusion then follows through a general argument, see In light of this example it is important to note that it will not matter to our general analysis, which controlled times are actually put into G: as long as the explicit provisions that we (will, viz. Assumption 4.3) have made, are in fact met. This generality allows to work with/choose, in a given specific situation, such a family G, as can be/is most informative of the problem.
(•) Finally, as already remarked, a typical example of an observed filtration is that of an observed process, i.e. for c ∈ C, X c is a process whose values (in some measurable space) we can observe, 
In other words, abstracting only slightly, and formulated without the unnecessary stochastic control-picture in the background, the following is a natural, and an extremely important, question. Suppose X and Y are two processes, defined on the same sample, and with values in the same measurable, space; S a stopping time of both (or possibly just one) of their {completed} natural filtrations. Suppose furthermore the stopped processes agree, X S = Y S {with probability one}. Must we have F X S = F Y S {F X S = F Y S } for the {completed} natural filtrations F X and F Y {F X and F Y } of X and Y ? Intuitively: yes, of course (at least when there are no completions in play). Formally, in the non-discrete case, it is not so straightforward. We obtain partial answers in Part 2.
We conclude this section with a rather general example illustrating the concepts introduced thusfar, focusing on the control-dependent informational flows, and with explicit references made to Settings 2.1 and 2.7.
Example 2.11. The time set is [0, ∞) (Setting 2.1(i); T = [0, ∞)). Given are: a probability space (Ω, F, P) (Settings 2.1(iii) and 2.1(iv); F c = F and P c = P for each c, Ω is itself); an open subset O ⊂ R d of Euclidean space; and a random (time-dependent) field (R o ) o∈O -each R o t being an F-measurable random variable, and the random map ((o, t) → R o t ) being assumed continuous from
/. Think of, for example, the local times of a Markov process, the Brownian sheet, solutions to SPDEs [3] etc. Now, the idea is to control the movement in such a random field, observing only the values of the field at the current space-time point determined by the control c. Rewards accrue as a function of the value of the field at the location of the control, penalized is the speed of movement.
To make this formal, fix a discount factor α ∈ (0, ∞), an initial point o 0 ∈ O, a measurable reward function f : O → R and a nondecreasing penalty function g : [0, ∞) → R.
The controls (members of C of Setting 2.1(ii)) are then specified as being precisely all the 
(Clearly the observed information G c depends in a highly non-trivial way on the chosen control.) Next, the payoff functional J from Setting 2.1(v) is given as:
Finally, with regard to Setting 2.7, define for any c ∈ C and controlled time S,
and then let
We will indeed see (Corollary 6.
is Blackwell (which can typically be taken to be the case). Regardless of whether or not (Ω, F) is in fact Blackwell, however, all the provisions of Settings 2.1 and 2.7, as well as those of Assumption 2.9, are in fact met.
The conditional payoff and the Bellman system
Definition 3.1 (Conditional payoff & Bellman system). We define for c ∈ C and S ∈ G:
3 For simplicity (so as not to be preoccupied with technical issues) we make all the processes in this example continuous.
and say c ∈ C is conditionally optimal at
is called the conditional payoff system and (V (c, S)) (c,S)∈C×G the Bellman system.
Remark 3.2.
(i) Thanks to Assumption 2.9, the essential suprema appearing in the definition of the conditional payoff system are well-defined (up to the relevant a.s. equalities).
(ii) Also, thanks to Setting 2.7(3), V (c, S) only depends on S through S c , in the sense that
Clearly the same holds true (trivially) of the system J.
Some further properties of the systems V and J follow. First,
Proof. The appropriate measurability of V (c, S) follows from its definition. Moreover, since each D(c, S) is non-empty, the integrability condition on the negative parts of V is also immediate (from the assumed integrability of the negative parts of J). Finally, the last claim follows from the fact
Second, Proposition 3.9, will (i) establish that in fact (J(c, S)) (c,S)∈C×G is a (C, G)-system in the sense of the definition which follows, and (ii) will also give sufficient conditions for the P c -a.s.
equality J(c, S) = J(d, S) to obtain on an event A ∈ G c S c , when c ∼ S d (addressing the situation when the two controls c and d agree "for all times" on A). Some auxiliary definitions and results are needed to this end; they precede Proposition 3.9.
Definition 3.5 (Times accessing infinity). For a sequence (t n ) n∈N of elements of T , we say it accesses infinity, if for all t ∈ T , there exists an n ∈ N with t ≤ t n . Lemma 3.6. Suppose H is a {P-complete} filtration on Ω {P being a complete probability measure} and (S n ) n≥1 a sequence of its stopping times {each defined up to P-a.s. equality}, which accesses infinity pointwise {or P-a.s.} on A ⊂ Ω, i.e. (S n (ω)) n∈N accesses infinity for {P-almost} every
Proof. The inclusion ⊃ is manifest. For the reverse inclusion, let t ∈ T and B ∈ H t (noting that
Lemma 3.7. Let {c, d} ⊂ C and A ⊂ Ω. Let furthermore (S n ) n∈N be a sequence in G accessing infinity {a.s.} on A for the controls c and d (i.e. (S h n (ω)) n∈N accesses infinity for {P h -almost} every ω ∈ A, each h ∈ {c, d}), and for which c
n for all n ∈ N, and the sequence (S n ) n∈N is {a.s.} nondecreasing on A and for the controls c and
Remark 3.8. We mean to address here abstractly the situation when the two controls c and d agree for all times on A.
Proof. By the consistency properties, certainly
n for all n ∈ N, then the traces of P c and
s.} nondecreasing on A, the latter union is a π-system (as a nondecreasing union of σ-fields, so even an algebra) on A. This, coupled with the fact that two finite measures of the same mass, which agree on a generating π-system, agree (by a monotone class argument), yields the second claim.
S c ; (ii) there exists a sequence (S n ) n∈N from G {a.s.} nondecreasing and accessing infinity on A for the controls c and d, and for which c ∼ Sn d and A ∈ G c S c n for each n ∈ N;
, it is the same) on A under the indicated conditions, we need only establish that:
where finally one can apply Lemma 3.7.
4. Bellman's principle
s. and P d -a.s., whenever c ∼ S d, (iii) (resp. the negative, positive part of) X(c, S) is integrable and (iv) for all {S, T } ⊂ G and c ∈ C with
In order to be able to conclude the supermartingale property of the Bellman system (Bellman's principle), we shall need to make a further assumption (see Assumption 4.3 below; cf. Lemma A.3).
The following proposition gives some guidance as to when it may be valid.
has the "( , M )-upwards lattice property": (We shall make it explicit in the sequel when this assumption will be in effect.) (iii) Assumption 4.3 is of course trivially verified when the filtrations G all consist of (probabilistically) trivial σ-fields alone.
Example 2.11 continued. We verify that in Example 2.11, under the assumption that in fact the base (Ω, F) therein is Blackwell, Property (1) from Proposition 4.2 obtains with M = ∞, = 0.
and
; by Theorem 6.6, Proposition 6.5, and Proposition 6.9 to follow in Part 2, all
O-valued process with initial value o 0 , satisfying the requisite integrability condition on f − and g + . So
Furthermore, if c * ∈ C is conditionally optimal at S ∈ G and E P c * J(c * ) < ∞, then c * is conditionally optimal at T for any T ∈ G satisfying
In particular, if c * is optimal, then it is conditionally optimal at 0, so that if further E P c * J(c * ) < ∞, then c * must be conditionally optimal at any S ∈ G.
Conversely, and regardless of whether Assumption 4.3 holds true, if G includes a sequence (S n ) n∈N 0 for which (i) S 0 = 0, (ii) the family (V (c * , S n )) n≥0 has a constant P c * -expectation and is uniformly integrable, and (iii) V (c * , S n ) → V (c * , ∞), P c * -a.s. (or even just in P c * -probability), as n → ∞, then c * is optimal.
Proof. Let {S, T } ⊂ G and c ∈ C with
, so that we obtain via Proposition 4.5, P c -a.s.,
, which establishes the first claim. The second follows at once from the final conclusion of Proposition 4.5. Then let c * be optimal and {S, T } ⊂ G with
is P c * -integrable, and the martingale property also follows.
Next, if c * is conditionally optimal at S, E P c * J(c * ) < ∞, and
On the other hand, for sure, V (c * , T ) ≥ J(c * , T ), P c * -a.s., so
is conditionally optimal at T . The penultimate claim is then also evident.
For the final claim notice that V (c * ,
Proposition 4.7. Under Assumption 4.3 and insisting that ∞ ∈ G, V is the minimal (C, G)-supermartingale system W satisfying the terminal condition
Proof. That V is a (C, G)-supermartingale system satisfying the indicated terminal condition is clear from the definition of V and Theorem 4.6. Next, let W be a (C, G)-supermartingale system satisfying said terminal condition. Then for all (c, T ) ∈ C × G and d ∈ D(c, T ), P c -a.s. and P d -a.s.
A solved formal example
Recall the notation of Section 2. The time set will be [0, ∞) (Setting 2.1(i); T = [0, ∞)).
Fix next a discount factor α ∈ (0, ∞), let (Ω, H, P) be a probability space supporting two independent, sample-path-continuous, Brownian motions B 0 = (B 0 t ) t∈[0,∞) and B 1 = (B 1 t ) t∈[0,∞) , starting at 0 and −x ∈ R, respectively (Setting 2.1(iii) and 2.1(iv); F c = H, P c = P for all c, Ω is itself). We may assume (Ω, H) is Blackwell. By For c ∈ C, define next: 
Notice that E
Finally, with regard to Setting 2.7, introduce for every c ∈ C and controlled time S,
Then let:
all the provisions of Section 2 (specifically, those of Setting 2.1, Setting 2.7, as well as Assumption 2.9) being thus satisfied. Thanks to Corollary 6.7, G = {controlled times S such that ∀c∀d(
Moreover, Assumption 4.3 can also be verified, as follows (here, the interplay between the nature of the controls, and the observed information, will be crucial to the argument). Let {c 1 , c 2 } ⊂ C, 
t | {P <t}∩(Ω\A) (also, by Theorem 6.6, Proposition 6.5 and Proposition 6.9, from Part 2, {{t ≤ P }, A∩{P < t}, (Ω\A)∩{P < t}} ⊂ σ((B c 1 )
. Then it will suffice to argue that c1 0,P = c 1 
(a) Identify an instance of K for which any control in C is optimal. It will emerge that Here K will have the form:
with L nonnegative, measurable, bounded in polynomial growth; γ := √ 2α. We will see, should be a (G c , P)-supermartingale (in t ∈ [0, ∞)). Moreover, if an optimal strategy c * exists, then S c * should be a (G c * , P)-martingale (or, when dealing with a sequence/net of optimizing controls, it should, in expectation, 'be increasingly close to being one').
Guided by (5.1), let us now consider the semimartingale decomposition of S c , assuming K is such that in fact (i) for z ∈ R, s ∈ [0, ∞) (again with a slight abuse of notation) V (z, s) = V (z) (i.e.
no explicit lag dependence in the value function); (ii) V is of class C 1 , and also twice differentiable, 4 More precisely, for z ∈ R, u ∈ [0, ∞), V (z, u) is the optimal payoff of the related optimal control problem in which, ceteris paribus, B 1 = z + Hu+·, for a Brownian motion H independent of B 0 .
with second derivative continuous, except possibly at finitely many points, wherein still the left and right derivatives exist and remain continuous from the left, respectively right; and (iii) V and V are bounded in polynomial growth.
The semimartingale decomposition (for which we require, in principle, the "usual conditions") may then be effected relative to the completed measure P and the usual augmentation G c + of G c , with respect to which Z c is a semimartingale (indeed, its jump part is clearly of finite variation, whilst its continuous part is, in fact, a Brownian motion relative to the augmentation of the natural filtration of (B 0 , B 1 )).
We thus obtain, by the Itô- Tanaka Note that the starred parts combine into:
which is a (G c + , P)-martingale in t ∈ [0, ∞) (since |Z c | ≤ B 0 + B 1 ). On the other hand, the compensator of the double-starred term is: 
This concludes the first part of the analysis, deriving what ought to hold of V . In the second part we flip, as is usual, the argument upside-down. V will be specified a priori (along with K); S c remains defined in terms of this prespecified V , viz. Eq. (5.1); and then it is shown that V (x) is the optimal payoff, via the semimartingale decomposition of S c which the latter will continue to Indeed, as regards (a), we may take K(z, t) = −2z/α and V (z) = z/α, for z ∈ R, in which case 2), and passing to the limit t → ∞ via dominated convergence, we see that V (x) is the optimal payoff, and any control from C realizes it.
For a less degenerate case, let us solve (5.8) on z ∈ [−l, ∞) and in the general solution throw away the exponentially increasing part. Then V (z) = ψ(z) for z ≥ −l, where ψ(u) := u α + Ae −γu (u ∈ R, A ∈ R, γ := √ 2α). To obtain a symmetric function of V it is natural to take l = 0 and then
For such a V , (5.6) is in fact satisfied by a strict inequality on z ∈ (−∞, 0); and V is C 1 for A = 1/(γα) (and then it is even C 2 ). Then (5.9) and (5.7) essentially necessitate taking the form of K as specified in (b) on p. 17. Now, to see that c (as described in (b)) is in fact an optimizing net of controls (as ↓ 0), first take expectations in (5.1)-(5.2), and pass to the limit as t → ∞ (via dominated and monotone convergence), in order to see that V (x) ≥ EJ(c) for each c ∈ C; second apply (5.1)-(5.2) to c = c , pass to the limit t → ∞, and note that
To convince the reader of this, it will suffice to check:
for each T ∈ (0, ∞). Fix such a T . Further, it will be sufficient to argue that:
for each a ∈ (0, ∞). Fix such an a. It will now be enough to demonstrate that P-a.s. be an s ∈ A with s ∈ A k is bounded by some number, depending on the sample point, but not on , and this establishes the claim.
Part 2. Stopping times, stopped processes and natural filtrations at stopping timesinformational consistency
Recall from p. 9 the contents of the third, final, bullet point remark following Assumption 2.9
-it is to the questions posed and motivated there, that we now turn our attention. Along the way, we shall (be forced to) investigate (i) the precise relationship between the sigma-fields of the stopped processes, on the one hand, and the natural filtrations of the processes at these stopping times, on the other and (ii) the nature of the stopping times of the processes and of the stopped processes, themselves. Here is an informal statement of the kind of results that we will /seek to/ formally establish (F X denotes the natural filtration of a process X):
If X is a process, and S a time, then S is a stopping time of F X , if and only if it is a stopping time of F X S . When so, then F X S = σ(X S ). In particular, if X and Y are two processes, and S is a stopping time of either F X or of F Y , with X S = Y S , then S is a stopping time of F X and F Y both, moreover F X S = σ(X S ) = σ(Y S ) = F Y S . Further, if U ≤ V are two stopping times of F X , X again being a process, then
. We will perform this investigation into the nature of information generated by processes in the two 'obvious' settings: first the 'measure-theoretic' one, without reference to probability measures (Section 6) and then the 'probabilistic' one, involving a complete probability measure, under which all the filtrations and σ-fields are completed (Section 7). This will also dovetail nicely with the parallel development of the two frameworks for stochastic control -the 'measure-theoretic' and the 'probabilistic' one -from Part 1. Now, the most important findings of this part are as follows:
• Lemma 6.2, Proposition 6.5, Theorem 6.6, Theorem 6.7 and Proposition 6.9, in the 'measure-theoretic' case;
• Corollaries 7.2 and 7.3 (in discrete time) and Proposition 7.6, Corollaries 7.7, 7.9 and 7.10 Finally, we note that the whole of the remainder of this part is in fact independent from the rest of the paper (in particular, from Part 1).
The 'measure-theoretic' case
We begin by fixing quite a bit of notation and by enunciating a couple of well-known (and some less well-known) measure-theoretic facts along the way -we ask the reader to bear with us.
(•) T = N 0 or T = [0, ∞), with the usual linear order, Ω is some set and (E, E) a measurable space. By a process (on Ω, with time domain T and values in E), we mean simply a collection X = (X t ) t∈T of functions from Ω into E. With F X t := σ(X s : s ∈ [0, t]) (for t ∈ T ), F X = (F X t ) t∈T is then the natural filtration of X. 5 Remark that for every t ∈ T , F X t = σ(X| [0,t] ), with
The ω-sample path of X, X(ω), is the mapping from T into E, given by (t → X t (ω)), ω ∈ Ω. In this sense, X may of course be viewed as an F X ∞ /E ⊗T -measurable mapping, indeed F X ∞ = σ(X). (•) If further S : Ω → T ∪ {∞} is a time and G is a filtration on Ω, then G S := {A ∈ G ∞ :
A ∩ {T ≤ t} ∈ G t for all t ∈ T } is the filtration G at (the time) S, whilst the stopped process X S (of a process X) is defined via X S t (ω) := X S(ω)∧t (ω), (ω, t) ∈ Ω × T . Note, that if T = N 0 , X is a G-adapted process and S is a G-stopping time, then X S is automatically adapted to the stopped
On the other hand, in continuous-time, when T = [0, ∞), if X is G-progressively measurable and S is a G-stopping time, then X S is also adapted to the stopped filtration (G t∧S ) t∈[0,∞) (and is G-progressively measurable) [11, p. 9 is Hausdorff) of a separable (resp. Hausdorff) space is separable (resp. Hausdorff). Lastly, if f : A → (B, B) is any map into a measurable space, then the atoms of σ(f ) always 'respect' the equivalence relation induced by f , i.e., for {ω, ω } ⊂ A, if f (ω) = f (ω ), then ω and ω belong to the same atom of σ(f ):
Now, a key result in this section will establish that, for a process X and a stopping time S thereof, σ(X S ) = F X S , i.e. that the initial structure (with respect to E ⊗T ) of the stopped process coincides with the filtration of the process at the stopping time -under suitable conditions. Indeed, our first lemma towards this end tells us that elements of F X S are functions (albeit not (as yet) necessarily measurable functions) of the stopped process X S .
Lemma 6.1 (Key lemma). Let X be a process (on Ω, with time domain T and values in E), S an F X -stopping time, A ∈ F X S . Then the following holds for every {ω, ω } ⊂ Ω:
Proof.
Then at least one of ω and ω must belong to {S ≤ t}, hence to X|
Similarly, since A ∈ F X S , A ∩ {S ≤ t} ∈ F X t , so that there is a U ∈ E ⊗[0,t] (resp. U ∈ E ⊗T ), with A ∩ {S ≤ t} = X| −1
[0,t] (U ) (resp. A ∩ {S ≤ t} = X −1 (U )), when t < ∞ (resp. t = ∞).
Our second lemma will allow to handle the discrete case. (1) S is an F X -stopping time.
(2) S is an F X S -stopping time.
The next step establishes that members of F X S are, in fact, measurable functions of the stopped process X S -at least under certain conditions (but always in the discrete case). Proposition 6.3. Let X be a process, S an F X -stopping time. If any one of the conditions (1)- (2)- (3) below is fulfilled, then F X S ⊂ σ(X S ) (where X S is viewed as assuming values in (E T , E ⊗T )).
(c) X S is constant on the atoms of σ(X S ), i.e. (ImX S , E ⊗T | ImX S ) is Hausdorff.
Remark 6.4.
(1) Condition (2) is clearly not very innocuous, but will typically be met when X is the coordinate process on a canonical space. 
Proof. Assume first (1). Let
A ∩ {S = n} = (X S ) −1 (Z) ∩ {S = n}). Thanks to Lemma 6.2, {S = n} ∈ σ(X S ), and we are done.
Assume next (2) . Let A ∈ F X S . Then 1 A = F • X for some E ⊗T /B({0, 1})-measurable mapping F . Since ImX S ⊂ ImX, for any ω ∈ Ω, there is an ω ∈ Ω with X(ω ) = X S (ω), and then thanks
Assume now (3). We apply Blackwell's Theorem. Specifically, on account of ((3)a) (Ω, G) is a Blackwell space and F X S is a sub-σ-field of G; on account of ((3)b), σ(X S ) is a separable sub-σ-field of G. Finally, thanks to ((3)c) and Lemma 6.1, every atom (equivalently, every element) of F X S is a union of atoms of σ(X S ). It follows that F X S ⊂ σ(X S ).
The continuous-time analogue of Lemma 6.2 is now as follows: 
(2) X S and X are both measurable with respect to a Blackwell σ-field G on Ω.
Then the following are equivalent:
(a) S is an F X -stopping time.
(b) S is an F X S -stopping time.
Proof. Suppose first S is an F X S -stopping time. Let t ∈ [0, ∞). Then {S ≤ t} ∈ F X S t . But
This follows from the fact that every atom of σ(X S | [0,t] ) is a union of atoms of σ(X| [0,t] ) (whence one can apply Blackwell's Theorem). To see this, note that if ω and ω belong to the same atom of σ(
, and so by Lemma 6.1 (applied to the process X S and the stopping time
We conclude that ω and ω belong to the same atom of σ(X S | [0,t] ).
Conversely, assume S is an F X -stopping time. Let t ∈ [0, ∞). Then {S ≤ t} ∈ F X S∧t , S ∧ t is an F X -stopping time and thanks to Proposition 6.3,
What finally follows is the main result of this section. As mentioned in the Introduction, it generalizes canonical-space results already available in literature.
Theorem 6.6 (Generalized Galmarino's test). Let X be a process, S an F X -stopping time. If
it is adapted to the stopped filtration (F X t∧S ) t∈T ) and either one of the conditions:
is met, then the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) 1 A is constant on every set on which X S is constant and
Proof. The first claim, which assumes T = N 0 , follows from Proposition 6.3 and the fact that automatically X S is F X S /E ⊗T -measurable in this case. In general, implication (i)⇒(ii) follows from Lemma 6.1. Implication (ii)⇒(iii) proceeds as follows.
Suppose first (1) . Let 1 A be constant on every set on which X S is constant, A ∈ F X ∞ . Then 1 A = F • X for some E ⊗T /B({0, 1})-measurable mapping F . Next, from ImX S ⊂ ImX, for any ω ∈ Ω, there is an ω ∈ Ω with X(ω ) = X S (ω), and then thanks to Lemma 6.1, X S (ω ) = X S (ω), so that by assumption,
Assume now (2) . Again apply Blackwell's Theorem. Specifically, on account of (2)(a) (Ω, G) is a Blackwell space and F X S is a sub-σ-field of G; on account of (2)(b), σ(X S ) is a separable sub-σ-field of G. Finally, if 1 A is constant on every set on which X S is constant and A ∈ F X ∞ , then 1 A is a G-measurable function (by (2)(a)), constant on every atom of σ(X S ) (by (2)(c)). It follows that
The implication (iii)⇒(i) is just one of the assumptions.
As for our original motivation into this investigation, we obtain: (2) ImX = ImY .
Remark 6.8. If T = N 0 , then in place of S being a stopping time of both F X and F Y , it is sufficient (ceteris paribus) to insist on S being a stopping time of just one of them. It is so by Lemma 6.2.
The same is true when (3) obtains, as long as the conditions of Proposition 6.5 are met for the time S and the processes X and Y alike.
Proof. If (1) or (3) hold, then the claim follows immediately from Theorem 6.6.
If (2) holds, let
for some E ⊗[0,t] /B({0, 1})-measurable (resp. E ⊗T /B({0, 1})-measurable) F , when t < ∞ (resp. t = ∞). Moreover, if ω ∈ Ω, there is an ω ∈ Ω with X(ω ) = Y (ω), hence X(ω) agrees with Y (ω) and X(ω ) on T ∩ [0, S(ω)], and thus thanks to Lemma 6.1, S(ω) = S(ω ) and 1
We also have:
Proposition 6.9 (Monotonicity of information). Let Z be a process (on Ω, with time domain T and values in E), U ≤ V two stopping times of F Z . If either T = N 0 or else the conditions:
Proof. In the discrete case the result follows at once from Theorem 6.6. In the opposite instance, we claim that the assumptions imply that every atom of σ(Z U ) is a union of the atoms of σ(Z V ): Let ω and ω belong to the same atom of σ(Z V ); then since (
, hence by Lemma 6.1 V (ω) = V (ω ) and U (ω) = U (ω ), and so a fortiori Z U (ω) = Z U (ω ), which implies that ω and ω belong to the same atom of σ(Z U ). Apply Blackwell's Theorem.
The case with completions
We have studied in the previous section natural filtrations proper -it is sometimes convenient to augment the latter by sets of probability zero 7 -we turn our attention to their completions.
Notation-wise, for a filtration G on Ω and a complete probability measure P, whose domain includes G ∞ , thereon, we denote by G P the completed filtration given by (for t ∈ T )
N being the collection of precisely all P-null sets; likewise if the domain of P includes a σ-field A on Ω, then A P := A ∨ N . For any other unexplained notation, that we shall use, we refer the reader to the beginning of Section 6. And while /for ease of language/ we will continue to work in the sequel with processes/stopping times, their equivalence classes (with respect to indistinguishability/a.s. equality), would of course (as appropriate) suffice.
First, all is well in the discrete case.
Lemma 7.1. Let T = N 0 , G a filtration on Ω. Let furthermore P be a complete probability measure
on Ω, whose domain includes G ∞ ; S a G P -stopping time. Then S is P-a.s. equal to a stopping time S of G; and for any G-stopping time U , P-a.s. equal to S, G U P = G P S . Moreover, if U is another random time, P-a.s equal to S, then it is a G P -stopping time, and G
Proof. For each n ∈ N 0 , we may find an A n ∈ G n , such that {S = n} = A n , P-a.s. Then
is a G-stopping time, P-a.s. equal to S. Let now U be any time with these two properties of S . To show G U P ⊂ G P S , it suffices to note that (i) N , the collection of all P-null sets, is contained in G P S and (ii) G U ⊂ G P S , both of which are easy to see. Conversely, if A ∈ G P S , then for each n ∈ N 0 ∪ {∞}, A ∩ {S = n} = B n , P-a.s., for some B n ∈ G n , and hence the event ∪ n∈N 0 ∪{∞} B n ∩ {U = n} belongs to G U , and is P-a.s. equal to A.
Finally, let U be another random time, P-a.s equal to S. For each n ∈ N 0 ∪ {∞}, there is then a C n ∈ G n with {U = n} = {S = n} = C n , P-a.s., whence U is a G P -stopping time. It follows, by what we have shown already, that we can find Z, a G-stopping time, P-a.s. equal to S, hence U , and thus with G
Corollary 7.2. Let T = N 0 ; X and Y processes (on Ω, with time domain N 0 and values in E); P X and P Y be complete probability measures on Ω whose domains contain F X ∞ and F Y ∞ , respectively, 7 Making them also (in the temporally continuous case, if they are not automatically already) right-continuous, is less interesting from the point of view of stochastic control, since the stopping times one is really interested in are (usually) foretellable/predictable, anyway. In general, this is also less of an innocuous operation. For, one might well concede to being unable to act on a null set; one cannot but feel apprehensive about having to 'peak infinitesimally into the future' before being able to act in the present. Indeed, we will see in the sequel that even the act of completion alone is less harmless than might seem at first glance.
and sharing their null sets. Suppose furthermore S is an F X P X and an F Y P Y stopping time, with
Proof. From Lemma 7.1 we can find stopping times U and V of F X and F Y , respectively, both P X and P Y -a.s. equal to S. The event {X U = Y V } is P X and P Y -almost certain. It then follows further from Theorem 6.6 and Lemma 7.1 again, that F X
Corollary 7.3. Let T = N 0 , X a process (on Ω, with time domain N 0 and values in E), P a complete probability measure on Ω whose domain contains F X ∞ ∨ F X S ∞ , S : Ω → T ∪ {∞} a random time. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) S is an F X P -stopping time.
(2) S is an F X S P -stopping time.
Proof. That the first implies the second is clear from Lemma 7.1, Lemma 6.2 and the fact that two processes, which are versions of each other, generate the same filtration, up to null sets. For the converse, one resorts to re-doing the relevant part of the proof of Lemma 6.2, adding P-a.s.
qualifiers as appropriate; the details are left to the reader.
The temporally continuous case is much more involved. Indeed, we have the following significant negative results.
Example 7.4. Let Ω = (0, ∞)×{0, 1}; F be the product of the Lebesgue σ-field on (0, ∞) and of the power set on {0, 1}; thereon P = Exp(1) × Unif({0, 1}) be the product law (which is complete; any law on the first coordinate with a continuous distribution function would also do); e (respectively a) be the projection onto the first (respectively second) coordinate. Define the process N t = a(t − e)1 [0,t] (e), t ∈ [0, ∞) (starting at zero, the process N departs from zero at time e with unit positive drift, or remains at zero, for all times, with equal probability, independently of e). Its completed natural filtration, F N P , is already right-continuous.
, a measurable mapping. It follows that for t > 0, for each natural
(iii) For each natural 8 Of course, all these completions really only depend on the null sets, which the two measures P X and P Y share by assumption.
, so A ∩ {e > t + 1/n} is ∅ or {e > t + 1/n} according as 0 is an element of G n or not (note this is a "monotone" condition, in the sense that as soon as we once get a non-empty set for some natural n, we subsequently get {e > t + 1/m} for all natural m ≥ n). It follows that A ∩ {e > t} = ∪ n∈N (A ∩ {e > t + 1/n}) ∈ {∅, {e > t}} ⊂ F N t . Let further U be the first entrance time of the process N to (0, ∞). By the Début Theorem, this is a stopping time of F N P , but is P-a.s. equal to no stopping time of F N at all.
For, suppose that it were P-a.s. equal to a stopping time V of F N . Then there would be a set Ω , belonging to F, of full P-measure, and such that V = U on Ω . Tracing everything (F, P, N , a, e, V ) onto Ω , we would obtain (F , P , N , a , e , V ), with (i) V equal to the first entrance time of N to (0, ∞) and (ii) V a stopping time of F N , the natural filtration of N .
, so ω and ω should belong to the same atom of F N t ; yet {V ≤ t} ∈ F N t , with 1 {V ≤t} (ω) = 1 and 1 {V ≤t} (ω ) = 0, a contradiction.
, since the event A := {U < ∞} = {a = 1} that N ever assumes a positive drift belongs to F N P U (which fact is clear), but not to σ(N U ) P = σ(0) P , the trivial σ-field (it is also obvious; P(a = 1) / ∈ {0, 1}). The problem here, as it were, is that in completing the natural filtration the (seemingly innocuous) operation of adding all the events negligible under P is done uncountably many times (once for every deterministic time). In particular, this cannot be recovered by a single completion of the sigma-field generated by the stopped process. Completions are not always harmless. analogue of Lemma 6.1 should be /nor, indeed, how to go about proving one, and then using it to produce the relevant counter-parts to the results of Section 6/.
However, the situation is not so bleak, since positive results can be got at least for foretellable/predictable stopping times: As in the case of discrete time -by an indirect method;
reducing the 'probabilistic' to the 'measure-theoretic' case. We use here the terminology of [4, p. 127, Definitions IV.69 & IV.70]; given a filtration G and a probability measure Q on Ω, whose domain includes G ∞ :
A random time S : Ω → [0, ∞] is predictable relative to G if the stochastic interval T, ∞ is predictable. It is Q-foretellable relative to G if there exists a Q-a.s. nondecreasing sequence (S n ) n≥1 of G-stopping times with S n ≤ S, Q-a.s for all n ≥ 1 and such that, again Q-a.s., lim n→∞ S n = S, S n < S for all n on {S > 0};
foretellable, if the a.s. qualifications can be omitted.
Note that in a P-complete filtration (P itself assumed complete), the notions of predictable, fore- Proposition 7.6. Let T = [0, ∞), G be a filtration on Ω. Let furthermore P be a complete probability measure on Ω, whose domain includes G ∞ ; S a predictable stopping time relative to G P .
Then S is P-a.s. equal to a predictable stopping time P of G. Moreover, if U is any G-stopping time, P-a.s. equal to S, then G P S = G U P . Finally, if S is another random time, P-a.s equal to S, then it is a G P -stopping time, and G P S = G P S .
Proof. The first claim is contained in [4, p. 133, Theorem IV.78].
Now let U be any G-stopping time, P-a.s. equal to S. The inclusion G P S ⊃ G U P is obvious. Then take A ∈ G P S . Since A ∈ G P ∞ = G ∞ P , there is an A ∈ G ∞ , such that A = A, P-a.s. Furthermore, since S is foretellable,
is foretellable also (if (S n ) n≥1 P-foretells S, then ((S n ) A ∧ n) n≥1 P-foretells S A ). Hence, by what we have already shown, there exists V , a G-stopping time, with V = S A , P-a.s. So, P-a.s., A = (A ∩ {U = ∞}) ∪ {V = U < ∞} ∈ G U .
Finally let S be a random time, P-a.s. equal to S. Clearly, it is a G P -stopping time. Moreover, we have found P , a G-stopping time, P-a.s. equal to S and (by way of corollary) S . It follows from what we have just shown that G P S = G P P = G P S .
From this we can obtain easily a couple of useful counter-parts to the findings of Section 6 in the continuous case. They (Corollaries 7.7, 7.9 and 7.10 that follow) should be used in conjunction with (in this order) (i) the fact that a standard Borel space 9 -valued random element measurable with respect to the completed domain of the probability measure Q, is Q-a.s. equal to a random element measurable with respect to the uncompleted domain of Q (Q being the completion of Q) [10, p. 13, Lemma 1.25] and (ii) the existence part of Proposition 7.6. Loosely speaking one imagines working on the completion of a nice (Blackwell) space. Then the quantities measurable with respect to the completed sigma-fields are a.s. equal to quantities measurable with respect to the uncompleted sigma-fields, and to them the 'measure-theoretic' results apply. Taking completions again, we arrive at the relevant 'probabilistic' statements. The formal results follow.
Corollary 7.7. Let T = [0, ∞), Z a process and P a complete probability measure on Ω, whose domain includes F Z ∞ , P an F Z P predictable stopping time. If further for some process X Pindistinguishable from Z and a stopping time S of F X , P-a.s. equal to P :
(1) (Ω, G) is Blackwell for some σ-field G ⊃ F X S ∨ σ(X S ). (2) σ(X S ) is separable. Taking completions in F X S ⊂ σ(X S ), we obtain by Proposition 7.6, as applied to the stopping time P of F X P , P-a.s. equal to the stopping time S of F X :
Corollary 7.9. Let Z and W be two processes (on Ω, with time domain [0, ∞) and values in E); P Z and P W probability measures on Ω, sharing their null sets, and whose domain includes F Z ∞ and F W ∞ , respectively; P a predictable F Z P Z and F W P W -stopping time. Suppose furthermore Z P = W P , P Z and P W -a.s. If for two processes X and Y , P Z and P W -indistinguishable from Z and W , respectively, and some stooping times S and U of F X and F Y , respectively, P Z and P W -a.s. equal to P :
(1) (Ω, G) (resp. (Ω, H)) is Blackwell for some σ-field G ⊃ F X ∞ (resp. H ⊃ F Y ∞ ). (2) σ(X S ) (resp. σ(Y U )) is separable and contained in F X S (resp. F Y U ).
Proof. The claim follows from Corollary 7.7, and the fact that again (similarly as in the proof of Corollary 7.7) σ(X S ) ⊂ F X S implies σ(Z P ) P Z ⊂ F Z P Z P ; likewise for W .
Corollary 7.10. Let X be a process (on Ω, with time domain [0, ∞) and values in E); P a complete probability measure on Ω, whose domain includes F X ∞ ; S and P two predictable stopping times of F X P with S ≤ P . Let U and V be two stopping times of the natural filtration of a process Z, Pindistinguishable from X, P-a.s. equal to S and P , respectively, with U ≤ V , and such that: (Ω, G)
is Blackwell for some σ-field G ⊃ σ(Z V ) ∨ σ(Z U ), (ImZ V , E ⊗T | ImZ V ) is Hausdorff and σ(Z V ) is separable. Then σ(X S ) P ⊂ σ(X P ) P . Remark 7.11. the existence part of Proposition 7.6 here, is as follows: There are U and V , stopping times of F X , P-a.s. equal to S and P , respectively. Then, true, U ≤ V only P-a.s. But V := V 1(U ≤ V ) + U 1(U > V ) is also a stopping time of F X , P-a.s. equal to P , and it satisfies U ≤ V with certainty.
Proof. We find that σ(X S ) P = σ(Z U ) P and σ(X P ) P = σ(Z V ) P . Then apply Proposition 6.9.
We are not able to provide a (in conjunction with Proposition 7.6) useful counter-part to Proposition 6.5. (True, Proposition 7.6 says that given a predictable stopping time P of F X P P , there is a predictable stopping time U of F X P , P-a.s. equal to P . But this is not to say U is a stopping time of F X U , so one cannot directly apply Proposition 6.5.) This is open to future research.
